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Foldpair security

Protected content is encrypted on your devices before it reaches the relay. This page says exactly where that guarantee starts, where it stops, and what to check yourself.

By Foldpair team · updated November 17, 2026 · Sources and evidence

Direct answer: Folder contents are end-to-end encrypted with AES-256-GCM on the device for folders that have end-to-end encryption enabled, and clipboard sync is end-to-end encrypted too. Keys are held by your devices, the relay handles ciphertext for those paths, and TLS protects the transport. A folder where end-to-end encryption was never enabled, or whose devices do not all support it yet, is held on the relay as plaintext. The relay can still see metadata such as file names, sizes and timing, and encryption does not protect a device that is itself compromised.

Free plan ($0) for Windows, macOS and Linux, plus an Android app for one-off file transfers. No credit card to download. Clipboard contents, and folder contents when folder encryption is on (the default for folders you own on desktop), are encrypted on your device with AES-256-GCM.

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Security at a glance

WhatHow it is protectedWhat the relay sees
Synced folder contentsEncrypted on the device with AES-256-GCM before upload, for folders that have end-to-end encryption enabled. A folder where it was never enabled is uploaded as plaintext.Ciphertext for end-to-end folders. File contents in the clear for a folder where it was never enabled.
Clipboard sync (text and images)Each item is encrypted on the device under your account key before it leaves.Ciphertext, plus the item type, source device and time.
Send to a device or contactEncrypted on the sending device and sealed to the recipient's keys.Ciphertext until the recipient collects it. Contact sends trust the contact's key on first use, see below.
Browser share linksEncrypted on the device; the key travels only in the part of the link after the # sign.Ciphertext. The key is never sent to the relay.
KeysGenerated and kept on participating devices, in the operating system's secure store, plus a user-only file that the local sync agent reads.Only public keys and sealed (wrapped) keys it cannot open.
TransportTLS between each client and the relay, in addition to the encryption above.Authenticated traffic.

The first row is the one most people ask about, and it has a condition. The relay is the server that sits between your devices when they are not on the same network. For a folder with end-to-end encryption enabled it receives file contents that are already encrypted, so it has no key with which to open them. A folder where it was never enabled is not protected that way. For a longer walk through the sync path, read how Foldpair works.

How a synced file is encrypted

Synced files are encrypted with AES-256-GCM, a standard authenticated cipher that both hides the content and detects any change to it. The app uses the cryptography built into the .NET platform (AES-GCM, ECDH and HKDF) rather than a home-made cipher.

Large files cannot be held in memory or verified only at the very end, so each file is encrypted as a sequence of independent frames of up to 1 MiB. Every frame gets its own fresh random 12-byte nonce and its own 16-byte authentication tag, and the file starts with a short format marker so a device can tell an encrypted object from a plain one.

Each frame also authenticates where it belongs: its folder, its object, its position in the file and whether it is the last frame. Reordering frames, cutting the end off a file, splicing two files together, or moving an encrypted blob into a different folder makes the integrity check fail instead of silently producing wrong data.

Where the keys live and how they reach your other devices

KeyWhat it doesWhere it lives
Device key pair (NIST P-256)Identifies one device and lets other devices send it keys safely.The private half stays in the device's secure store; only the public half is registered with the relay.
Folder key (256-bit, random)Encrypts the contents of one synced folder.Generated on the device that creates the folder; stored on devices in the OS secure store, with a copy in a user-only (mode 0600) handoff file that the local sync agent reads.
Account keyEncrypts clipboard items for your own devices.Held by your devices; handed to a new device sealed to that device's public key.

The hard problem is getting a key from a device that has it to another device through a server you do not want to trust. The sending device runs an ephemeral ECDH key agreement against the receiving device's public key, derives a one-time wrapping key with HKDF-SHA256, and wraps the content key with AES-256-GCM. The relay stores this sealed envelope and hands it over, but only the device holding the matching private key can open it. The envelope is also bound to the folder, the key version and the recipient device, so one misrouted to the wrong device fails to open instead of leaking.

On each platform the secure store is the one the operating system provides: Windows DPAPI, the macOS Keychain, or the Linux Secret Service. The local sync agent runs as a separate process and receives each folder key through a user-only file (mode 0600) in the application data, not through an environment variable, so a folder key exists in two places on your computer. The private half of a device key is not sent to the relay and is not written to logs.

What the relay and the network can see

Visible to the relayNot visible to the relay
File and folder names and pathsFile contents
The size of each fileClipboard contents
Which account, folder and device is involved, and whenFolder, account and device private keys
Delivery status and device presenceThe key inside a browser share link
Each device's public keyAnything you did not sync or send
For clipboard items: item type, source device and timeA readable copy of a file in an encrypted folder
A fingerprint (hash) of each file's contents, a plain one unless every device on the folder supports keyed hashesThe plain hash of a file in an encrypted folder, once every device on that folder supports keyed hashes

For an end-to-end encrypted folder, the identifier the relay uses to recognise a file's content is a keyed one, derived under the folder key, only when every live device of every active member of the folder supports it. If any device does not, the plain SHA-256 hash of the file goes to the relay instead, and the relay could compare it against known files. Either way it can tell that a file exists, how large it is and when it changed.

TLS protects the connection between a client and the relay, so someone on the same Wi-Fi or on the route in between sees an encrypted connection to the service, not your folder names. TLS is an additional layer, not a substitute: the file contents are already encrypted before they enter that connection.

If hiding the existence and timing of a transfer from the infrastructure is part of your threat model, no relay-based tool fully solves that, and this one does not claim to.

Clipboard, Send and share links

Clipboard sync covers text and images between your own devices, with its own on/off switch on each device. Each item is sealed on the device under your account key and bound to your account and to the item. Newer items also authenticate their content type, origin and purpose. Members of a folder you share never receive your clipboard.

Send moves a file to one of your devices or to a contact. The file is encrypted before it leaves and sealed to the recipient's keys. The relay keeps the encrypted file until the other side collects it, and a waiting send is dropped after 7 days. If the app cannot encrypt a send, the send fails; it does not fall back to plaintext. When you send to a contact, the desktop app trusts the contact key it sees on the first send (the mobile apps ask you to verify it first), and if that key later changes, sending stops until you check the security code. Until you have verified a contact, the first send relies on the relay giving you the right key, so verify important contacts.

A browser share link works differently from the rest. The file is encrypted on your device before upload and the key sits only in the part of the link after the # sign, which browsers do not send to the server. The recipient's browser decrypts it. Anyone who holds the full link can open the file, so share it the way you would share a password. The page that does the decrypting is served by the service, so a share link is only as safe as that page. For a file that must stay protected even if the service were compromised, use Send or a synced folder. Links created by older versions of the app, before share links were encrypted, are not end-to-end, and the download page says so when you open one.

How long encrypted data stays on the relay

The relay is a temporary delivery buffer, not an archive. Encrypted copies are removed once every participating device confirms delivery, or when the plan's retention period ends, whichever comes first. Under storage pressure the relay protects the latest live version of each synced file from early eviction so offline devices are not stranded, but the retention window stays the upper bound. If another device is offline, its changes wait on the relay in encrypted form and are delivered when it returns, within that period. The working copies stay on your devices.

PlanUndelivered data held at onceRetention windowDevices
Free1.5 GB24 hours2
Pro10 GB7 days5
Team30 GB30 days10

These are the plan limits defined in the service. A file that is larger than the whole buffer of your plan can never fit, and waiting does not help; a file that is only larger than the space currently free waits in the queue until room is available. Details are in the relay help article. If an offline device returns after the window has passed, an online device can upload the file again on demand.

Shared folders, roles and device links

Sharing a folder with another person's account always needs their explicit acceptance; nothing downloads silently. Each member is an Owner, an Editor or a Reader. A Reader can read and download files, and the server rejects a Reader's uploads and edits, so write access is enforced on the server rather than only hidden in the interface. The member roles help page lists what each role can do.

Adding one of your own devices uses a QR code, a link or a short code that expires after a short time. Anyone who holds that link or code can add themselves to your account, not just to one folder, so treat it like a password and share it only with a device you own. If a device you do not recognise appears in your devices list, revoke it.

What encryption does not cover

  • A compromised device. Encryption protects content in transit and on the relay. Malware on a device that holds the keys can read the same files you can.
  • Metadata. File names, paths, sizes and timing remain visible to the relay, as described above.
  • A revoked or lost device. Revoking a device removes it from your account and retires its key, but it cannot take back what that device already holds, such as synced files and folder keys. Keep full-disk encryption and a screen lock on every device, and treat a lost device as having the files it had.
  • Losing every device. Keys live on your devices and the relay never holds a key that opens your content, so Foldpair cannot decrypt your files for you if every device that held the keys is gone. Keep an independent backup.
  • A lost, unlocked or shared computer. Synced files are ordinary files on disk, and the app is not a replacement for disk encryption or a screen lock.
  • Anyone holding a full share link. The link is the key.
  • Deletion and mistakes. A deleted or overwritten file can sync to your other devices. Check the folder's recovery bin and read about conflict handling before you rely on it.

A short checklist for a safer setup

  1. Install the app only from the download page and keep it updated.
  2. Sign in on each device yourself, and check the devices list for anything you do not recognise.
  3. Share folders only with people you trust, and give Reader access unless they need to edit.
  4. Turn the clipboard switch off on any device where you do not want clipboard sync.
  5. Send a small test file first and confirm it arrives intact on the other device.
  6. Keep full-disk encryption and a screen lock on every computer that holds synced files.
  7. Keep an independent backup of anything you cannot recreate.

Frequently asked questions

Is Foldpair end-to-end encrypted?

Clipboard items and sent files are encrypted on the device, and synced folder contents are too, for folders that have end-to-end encryption enabled. Keys are held by participating devices, and the relay handles ciphertext on those paths. A folder where it was never enabled is uploaded as plaintext. Browser share links are encrypted with the key in the part of the link after the # sign. Metadata such as names and sizes is not hidden from the relay.

Can the Foldpair relay read my files?

For folders with end-to-end encryption enabled, no. It receives content that is already encrypted and is never given a folder key or account key. It can see file names, sizes, timing, which devices are involved, and a hash of each file's contents (a plain one unless every device on the folder supports keyed hashes). For a folder where end-to-end encryption was never enabled, the relay holds the file contents as plaintext, so check that the folder is enabled before relying on this.

Which encryption does Foldpair use?

AES-256-GCM for content, NIST P-256 key pairs for devices, and ECDH with HKDF-SHA256 to wrap keys for other devices. These are standard platform primitives, not custom ones.

Where are my encryption keys stored?

On your devices, in the operating system's secure store: Windows DPAPI, the macOS Keychain or the Linux Secret Service. The local sync agent also reads each folder key from a user-only (mode 0600) file in the application data, so a folder key exists in both places. The private device key is never sent to the relay.

Does TLS replace the end-to-end encryption?

No. TLS protects the connection to the relay and is an additional layer. The file contents are encrypted on the device before they enter that connection.

How long does the relay keep my encrypted data?

Until every participating device confirms delivery or the plan's retention window ends: 24 hours on Free, 7 days on Pro and 30 days on Team.

What happens if encryption fails on a device?

The upload waits. An end-to-end encrypted folder does not fall back to plaintext, and a send that cannot be encrypted fails.

Is it safe to use Foldpair for irreplaceable files?

Treat it as a beta sync tool, not a backup. Verify the first transfer with a small test file and keep a separate backup of anything you cannot recreate.

What if I revoke or lose a device, or lose all of them?

Revoking removes the device from your account and retires its key, but the device keeps the files and folder keys it already holds, so rely on disk encryption and a screen lock. If every device that held the keys is lost, Foldpair cannot decrypt your files, because the relay never holds a key that opens them. Keep an independent backup.

Sources and related reading

  1. Encryption and the relay — first-party product page with the format markers and key flow; checked November 17, 2026.
  2. The relay buffer — first-party help page for buffer size and retention; checked November 17, 2026.
  3. Owner, Editor and Reader — first-party help page for folder roles; checked November 17, 2026.
  4. Join with a link or code — first-party help page for device links; checked November 17, 2026.
  5. How the sync flow works — system flow and network boundaries; checked November 17, 2026.