Three observers: the relay, the network, the endpoint
When evaluating who might inspect a synchronized file, three distinct vantage points matter. First, the relay service buffers queued blobs in transit. Second, passive or active observers sit along the network path. Third, anyone with local execution on an enrolled endpoint sees everything your OS user can access. On-device encryption defends against the relay and the wire, while offering zero protection on a compromised endpoint.
| Channel | What shields it | What the relay still gets |
|---|---|---|
| Synced folder with encryption switched on | Contents sealed by AES-256-GCM before upload | Ciphertext, file names, sizes, timing |
| Synced folder with encryption never switched on | Only the TLS connection | The readable files |
| Clipboard text and images | Each item sealed on the originating computer | Ciphertext plus type, source device, time |
| Send to your device or a contact | Sealed on the sender and addressed to the recipient's keys | Ciphertext until pickup |
| Browser share link | File sealed before upload; key lives after the # of the URL | Ciphertext only |
| The hop to the relay | TLS, stacked on top of the rows above | An authenticated session |
Pay close attention to the second row above. Desktop clients enable end-to-end encryption automatically on newly owned folders, yet require every participating machine in that folder to support encryption first. Whenever encryption was never activated, or an older client remains attached, uploads cross the relay unencrypted. Verify a folder's encryption state before placing confidential files inside it. For the end-to-end lifecycle of an edit, read how Foldpair pairs folders.
Why AES-GCM, and the one rule it cannot forgive
Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) provides authenticated encryption. Rather than blindly outputting bytes, decryption verifies an integrity tag and aborts immediately if either the ciphertext or its associated metadata differs by even one bit. When routing data across an untrusted relay, strict rejection matters: any server-side truncation, chunk replay, or block substitution triggers a hard verification failure on the receiver instead of silent corruption.
Repeating a nonce under the same key breaks GCM catastrophically. Seal two distinct plaintexts with an identical key-nonce pair and an attacker can XOR both ciphertexts to strip out the keystream and forge authentication tags. Any sound GCM implementation must prevent collisions via monotonic counters or wide CSPRNG draws. As documented on Foldpair's encryption specification, files are split into independent chunks capped at 1 MiB, each sealed with its own random 96-bit nonce and 128-bit authentication tag so RAM usage stays predictable and every frame verifies prior to disk write.
Additional authenticated data binds each chunk to its folder ID, object identifier, frame index, and final-frame marker. Relocating ciphertext into a different folder, reordering chunks, or dropping the trailing frame causes tag verification to fail. Full wire framing appears on the encryption page.
Who holds which key
| Key | Used for | Stored |
|---|---|---|
| Per-device pair on NIST P-256 | Naming one device and letting peers address secrets to it | The private half never leaves the device's secure store; the relay is given the public half |
| Random 256-bit folder key | Sealing the files of a single folder | On each participating device, in the OS secure store, plus a user-only file read by the local sync agent |
| Account key | Sealing clipboard items between your devices | On your devices; a new device receives it wrapped to its own public key |
Handing folder keys to a newly paired computer across an untrusted server is the core cryptographic problem in relay sync. To solve it, an existing endpoint runs ephemeral ECDH against the new device's public key, derives a one-time wrapping key via HKDF-SHA256, and encrypts the folder key under AES-256-GCM. Although the relay stores and delivers that wrapped envelope, only the target device holds the private key required to unwrap it.
Platform credential stores back local key storage: Windows DPAPI, macOS Keychain, and Linux Secret Service. Since the background sync daemon runs as a separate process reading folder keys from a user-restricted local file, two local representations of each folder key exist per computer. Code executing under your OS account can read both locations, making endpoint security central to the real-world threat model.
What an operator of the relay can learn
| Observable | Not observable |
|---|---|
| File and folder names, paths | What is inside files of an encrypted folder |
| Each file's size | What was copied to the clipboard |
| Which account, folder and device acted, and when | Any private key of a device, folder or account |
| Delivery progress and which devices are online | The secret part of a browser share link |
| Clipboard item type, source device and time | Data you never synced or sent |
Path names and byte counts stay exposed to the relay without exception. Whenever a filename itself reveals confidential context, choose a neutral name before placing the file inside a synced directory. Concealing transfer timestamps or traffic volume falls outside what relay architectures can provide, and Foldpair makes no claim to hide traffic patterns.
Transport TLS stops local Wi-Fi snoopers from inspecting metadata like folder names over the air. Think of TLS strictly as link-layer defense: file payloads inside encrypted folders are already ciphertext before reaching the socket.
The two ways a folder ends up readable
Plaintext folder sync occurs in just two cases: either encryption was never enabled on that directory, or one participating endpoint lacks encryption support. Under both conditions, buffered file contents remain readable on the relay until delivery completes. As a corollary, binary delta patching operates exclusively on plaintext folders, whereas encrypted directories upload every modified file in full; see our relay and delta architecture write-up for benchmark data and design rationale.
Before syncing material that must stay opaque to the relay operator, upgrade all linked endpoints in that folder and confirm the UI marks the folder encrypted.
Clipboard, Send and share links
Clipboard mirroring shares copied text and images strictly among your own desktops via per-machine toggles, keeping external folder collaborators completely separate. Direct Send encrypts individual files locally to the target device's or contact's public keys. Because the desktop client pins a contact's key on first use and blocks future transfers if that key changes until you verify safety codes, check fingerprints over a separate channel for sensitive recipients.
Browser share links trade strict endpoint isolation for convenience. Your client encrypts the file prior to upload and places the decryption secret inside the URL fragment after #, a portion browsers omit from HTTP requests. Anyone possessing the complete URL can decrypt the download. However, the server delivers the web page running that browser decryption code, meaning share links rely on honest web assets; for high-assurance transfers that tolerate a hostile server, stick to encrypted folders or Send.
How long sealed data sits on the relay
Picture the relay as a transient staging queue. Queued blobs are deleted once every enrolled endpoint confirms receipt or when your plan's retention window runs out, whichever comes first, making retention an absolute upper bound. Changes saved while another computer is powered off stay queued there and download once it reconnects inside that window. Authoritative working files reside permanently on your own disks.
| Plan | Undelivered data allowed | Retention | Linked devices |
|---|---|---|---|
| Free | 1.5 GiB | 24 hours | 2 |
| Pro | 10 GiB | 7 days | 5 |
| Team | 30 GiB | 30 days | 10 |
Any single upload exceeding available buffer headroom waits in line locally. Read the relay help article for steps to clear stalled large files.
People and devices you admit
Shared directories require explicit invitation acceptance before anything syncs to another person. Collaborators hold an Owner, Editor, or Reader role; Readers may fetch and open files while the relay server blocks any upload or write attempt from them. Full permission details appear on the member roles page.
Enrolling another personal computer uses a pairing QR code, URL, or short numeric code. Since that token grants full account membership across your devices rather than single-folder access, guard it like a password and remove any unrecognized machine from your account settings.
Where encryption stops helping
- A compromised endpoint. Malware running as you reads whatever you can read.
- Metadata. Names, sizes and timing remain observable.
- A lost or revoked device. Revocation removes it from the account and retires its key, but files and folder keys already on it stay there.
- Losing every device. No key that opens your content exists on the relay, so recovery by us is impossible; keep your own backup.
- Syncing a mistake. A deleted or overwritten file can spread; read about conflict handling.
- Whole share links. The link is the key.
Tightening your setup
- Install from the download page and update promptly, because a folder is encrypted only when all its devices support it.
- Check that a folder reports as encrypted before adding sensitive files.
- Review the device list from time to time and revoke strangers.
- Prefer Reader access unless the other person must edit.
- Switch the clipboard off on machines you do not fully trust.
- Enable full-disk encryption and an automatic screen lock everywhere synced files live.
- Keep an independent backup of anything you could not recreate.
Questions about the model
Can the relay read my files?
Not in an encrypted folder: it receives AES-256-GCM ciphertext and holds no key. It does see names, sizes and timing. In a folder where encryption was never switched on, it holds readable files.
Why is TLS not enough?
TLS ends at the relay. Sealing on the device is what protects contents while they wait there.
What goes wrong if a GCM nonce repeats?
Secrecy and authenticity both fail for messages sharing that key and nonce, which is why a design needs a fresh nonce per encryption. The encryption page describes a fresh random 96-bit nonce for every frame.
Where do the keys live?
On your devices, in the operating system's secure store, with a user-only file for the local sync agent. The private device key is never sent to the relay.
Which primitives are used?
AES-256-GCM for content, NIST P-256 device keys, and ECDH with HKDF-SHA256 for wrapping keys to other devices.
How long does the relay keep sealed data?
Until every participating device confirms delivery or retention ends, whichever is first: 24 hours on Free, 7 days on Pro, 30 days on Team.
Can you recover my files if I lose all my devices?
No. The relay holds no key that opens them, so keep an independent backup.
Should irreplaceable files live only here?
No. Treat it as synchronization, not backup, and test with a small file first.
Related guides and comparisons
Sources and related reading
- Encryption page: formats and key flow — first-party page with the framing, nonce and key-distribution description; checked November 18, 2026.
- Relay help: buffer and retention — first-party help for what waits on the relay and for how long; checked November 18, 2026.
- Member roles help — first-party help for Owner, Editor and Reader; checked November 18, 2026.
- Device pairing help — first-party help for the link and code that add a device; checked November 18, 2026.
- Product overview: how a change travels — the sync path from device to relay to device; checked November 18, 2026.